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ADOPTION BY REFERENCE 
Amicus Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints (hereinafter "the Church" or "the LDS Church") adopts by reference the following 
sections of the parties' briefs, without taking sides on any disputed issues: 
(1) Jurisdiction, (2) Statement of the Issues, (3) Determinative Constitutional and 
Statutory Provisions, and (4) Statement of the Case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The liability limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.1 apply to churches and 
many other institutions that are very different - legally and otherwise - than the foster 
child placement agency at issue here. Churches, for example, enjoy constitutional 
protections not available to other organizations. The First Amendment bars claims that 
seek to hold churches liable for failing to prevent one church member from sexually 
abusing another where the abuse is unrelated to any church function, property, or 
position. With respect to churches, therefore, § 78-12-25.1 merely codifies important 
liability limitations that already exist in the law. 
The Savages contend that as applied to limit liability in their case § 78-12-25.1 
violates Article I, § 11 (Open Courts Clause) and Article I, § 24 (Uniform Operation of 
Laws Clause) of the Utah Constitution. The Church takes no position on the 
constitutionality of § 78-12-25.1 as applied to the unique facts, circumstances, and claims 
in this case. The narrow purpose of this amicus brief is to demonstrate that both the Open 
1 
Courts analysis and the Uniform Operation of Laws analysis are highly context specific. 
A law limiting liability might well be unconstitutional under both provisions when 
applied to the facts of one case, but perfectly constitutional in another case with very 
different facts or legal considerations. Accordingly, this Court should carefully tailor its 
holding to the specific circumstances and legal claims at issue here, leaving for another 
day whether the statute is constitutional in other contexts. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.1 Addresses a Serious Problem Facing Many 
Churches and Other Voluntary Associations. 
Churches and other voluntary associations are increasingly targeted by lawsuits 
based on their alleged failure to affirmatively act to prevent one church member from 
harming another, even where the harm is entirely unrelated to church activities, property, 
or positions. In contrast to the more widely publicized child abuse lawsuits in which a 
clergyman abuses a child in the congregation with the alleged knowledge of the church, 
these less-publicized cases typically involve allegations that a simple member of the 
church sexually abused a child in a home, neighborhood, or other non-church venue, and 
that the church breached a purported duty to protect the child from the abuse. Under this 
theory, churches become the insurers of their members' safety, at least with respect to 
injuries caused by other members whom church leaders allegedly knew or should have 
known might be dangerous. These lawsuits often seek awards in the millions or even 
hundreds of millions of dollars. 
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Such lawsuits present serious problems for churches. By doctrine and disposition, 
most churches are open and inviting to all who desire to attend and participate. 
Membership is generally available for the asking. In the LDS Church, for example, 
members of the public are welcome to attend Sunday meetings and many other activities. 
Baptism and Church membership are freely granted. The Church requires only that a 
person affirm belief in its central tenets, assert compliance with certain Church standards 
of conduct, and desire baptism. Other churches have even fewer requirements. Indeed, 
the theologies of many churches - such as various Protestant denominations - do not 
envision any inquiry into the proselyte's personal conduct or past. Theologically, these 
denominations believe such issues are solely between God and the person. 
In this respect, a church is very different from a professional child care or child 
placement organization with the means and structure to screen or even conduct 
background checks on its members in order to weed out persons with troubled pasts. It is 
the very purpose of churches to be a "hospital for sinners" and not a "club for the saved." 
Given this, churches cannot guarantee the legality of their members' private conduct vis a 
vis other members, nor function as investigative or police agencies over their 
congregations. Even if that were an option theologically, as a practical matter churches 
lack the resources to do so. As explained below, Utah law has never saddled churches 
with such a duty, and to impose one would have far-reaching effects. 
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Nevertheless, plaintiffs continue to try to hold churches responsible for sexual 
abuse inflicted by one member on another. For example, the LDS Church has been sued 
on several occasions for allegedly failing to warn or protect members from abuse by other 
mere members. In one Utah case, two plaintiffs (a mother and son) seek to hold the 
Church liable because its local leaders allegedly failed to warn them of an abusive 
member in their neighborhood. See Complaint, Doe et al v. Corporation of the President 
of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saiitts et ai, Civil No. 020904810 (3rd 
Judicial District, Utah), currently on appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals (Case No. 
20030511-CA). The plaintiffs allege that the perpetrator sexually abused the mother as a 
teenager and then, about two decades later, abused her son. The abuse allegedly occurred 
in and around the neighborhood; none of it was connected with any Church activity, 
property, or calling. Making similar claims, the plaintiffs in a Washington case seek to 
recover against the Church for sexual abuse perpetrated against them in the privacy of 
their own home by their own step-father. See Complaint, Doe v. Corporation of the 
President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, No. 02-2-0415-1 (Wash. 
Co. Superior Court). And the plaintiffs in a pending Oregon case seek recovery against 
the Church because they were abused by an unassuming 80-year old member who moved 
into their neighborhood. See Complaint, B.B. v. Corporation of the President of The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, No. 02-CV-80 (D. Or.). 
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By enacting Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.1, the Utah Legislature precluded such 
claims against churches, freeing them from the tremendous burden of litigating suits 
based on their failure to prevent member-on-member child abuse. The legal and policy 
concerns at issue with churches are very different from those in other contexts where 
§ 78-12-25.1 might apply. The context of this case entails many different considerations 
from those at issue when a church is being sued for member-on-member abuse. As 
demonstrated next, that difference mandates an analysis here that is limited to the facts 
and circumstances of this case, leaving open the question whether § 78-12-25.1 comports 
with the Open Courts and Uniform Operation of Laws provisions as applied to churches 
and other voluntary institutions. 
II. This Case Should Be Decided as an "As-Applied" Challenge That Does Not 
Decide the Constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.1 on Its Face or in 
Other Contexts. 
On appeal, the Savages contend that if § 78-12-25.1 truly bars their claims (a point 
they dispute), then it violates the Article I, § 11 (Open Courts Clause) of the Utah 
Constitution. See Brief of Appellants ("Brf. Aplt"), pp. 20-23. As this Court has 
recognized, a "statute may be unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to the facts 
of a given case. A facial challenge is the most difficult because it requires the challenger 
to 'establish that no set of circumstances exist under which the [statute] would be valid5" 
State of Utah v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, \ 4 n.2, 993 P.2d 854 {quoting United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). "[F]acial challenges to legislation are generally 
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disfavored," FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 223 (1990); whenever possible, the 
law prefers as-applied challenges over facial challenges.1 
This is doubly true for an Open Courts challenge. This Court's decisions make 
clear that the focus of the analysis is on whether the specific individual - the "injured 
person" {Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985)) - would have 
had a claim in the first place and, if so, whether the alternative remedies available to the 
person are "effective and reasonable." Id. As Chief Justice Durham, joined by Justices 
Howe and Russon, stated in her opinion in Wood v. University of Utah Medical Center, 
2002 UT 134, 67 ? 3d 436, petition for cert, filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3105 (U.S. Jul 11, 2003) 
(No. 03-82), "regarding article I, section 11 rights, this court should examine in an 
individualized inquiry whether a legislative enactment denies a litigant 'a remedy by due 
course of law5 in order to determine whether article I, section 11 applies to the case at 
hand." Id. Tf 50 (Durham, C.J., dissenting, joined by Howe, and Russon, JJ.; emphasis 
added).2 This individualized approach is most consistent with this Court's interpretation 
1
 Throughout their brief, the Savages acknowledge that their Open Courts Clause 
challenge is an as-applied one. Brf. Aplt. at 8 ("the statute, as applied, unconstitutionally 
violates Utah's guarantee of open courts") (emphasis added); see also id. at 20 ("As 
applied by the trial court, § 78-12-25.1 violates Utah's constitutional guarantee of open 
courts."); id. at 23 ("Therefore, as applied by the trial court, § 78-12-25.1 
unconstitutionally deprives the Savages of a claim for negligence against UYV in 
violation of Utah's guarantee of open courts."). 
2
 Part I of Chief Justice Durham's dissenting opinion in Wood regarding the 
appropriate standard of review "reflects the majority view on that issue." Id. *[ 41 
(Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
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of the rights guaranteed under the Open Courts Clause as being part of the "specific 
individual rights" in the Declaration of Rights section of the Utah Constitution. Id. f^ 43 
(emphasis added). 
Accordingly, it is standard for this Court to analyze Open Courts challenges as 
as-applied - not facial - attacks on the statutes at issue. The language of this Court's 
decisions repeatedly refers to the as-applied nature of such challenges.3 Whether or not a 
3
 Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1026-27 (Utah 2002) ("We therefore hold 
that the 1987 amendment is unconstitutional as it applies to municipalities operating 
electrical power systems We express no opinion on the constitutionality of the 
amendment as applied to other municipal activities since a lower standard of care may 
apply and different considerations may be relevant.") (emphasis added); Jensen v. State 
Tax Commission, 835 P.2d 965, 969 (Utah 1992) ("The requirement that [taxpayers] 
deposit the full amount of the deficiency assessed by the Commission is, on the facts of 
this case, an effective bar to judicial review. Thus, to the extent that Sec. 59-1-505 
precludes reasonable access to judicial review, it violates the open courts provision and is 
unconstitutional as applied. We make clear, however, that the statutory requirement is not 
unconstitutional in all cases. When a taxpayer is able to meet the requirement, the deposit 
must be paid.") (emphasis added); Maiyboy v. Utah Tax Commission, 904 P.2d 662, 670-
71 (Utah 1995) ("Unlike the petitioners in Jensen, the Maryboys were financially able to 
pay the $10,855.38 deficiency. Although the requirement in Sec. 59-1-505 
inconvenienced them, it did not deny them reasonable access to judicial review. As we 
made clear in Jensen, Sec. 59-1-505 'is not unconstitutional in all cases. When a taxpayer 
is able to meet the requirement, the deposit must be paid.' 835 P.2d at 969. This is just 
such a case."); McCorvey v. Utah State Dept Of Transportation, 868 P.2d 41 (Utah 1993) 
("We find no constitutional infirmity with the [Governmental Immunity] Act as applied to 
the facts of this case.") (emphasis added); Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 
348 (Utah 1989) ("[T]he holding of the Court [on the Open Courts issue] is limited to the 
following: the recovery limits statutes are unconstitutional as applied to University 
Hospital.") (emphasis added); Avis v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 837 
P.2d 585, 588 (Utah 1992) ("We further conclude that the [Worker's Compensation 
Statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99] as applied to petitioner does not violate 
the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution because he knew of his injury within 
the limitations period.") (emphasis added). 
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statute survives application in a particular case turns on the particular facts of that case. 
Indeed, given that § 78-12-25.1 covers numerous potential causes of action, innumerable 
factual scenarios, and many different types of defendants with potentially differing legal 
duties, a facial challenge proving that the statute is unconstitutional in every context 
might well be impossible. 
An excellent example of a situation where § 78-12-25.1 is most likely 
constitutional can be found in the context of claims against churches for failure to prevent 
child sexual abuse by one member against another. Where no church function, property, 
or official calling is involved, no court has ever held that a church has a duty to protect 
members from the private misconduct of others. To the contrary, this and other courts 
have expressly held that churches do not owe these types of affirmative duties to their 
members because of the First Amendment problems they would create: 
Defining such a duty would necessarily require a court to express the 
standard of care to be followed by other reasonable clerics in the 
performance of their ecclesiastical counseling duties which, by its very 
nature, would embroil the courts in establishing the training, skill, and 
standards applicable for members of the clergy in this state in a diversity of 
religions professing widely varying beliefs. This is as impossible as it is 
unconstitutional; to do so would foster an excessive government 
entanglement with religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. 
Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2001 UT 25, \ 23, 21 P.3d 
198; see also Biyan R. v. Watchtower v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, 738 A.2d 
839, 847 (Me. 1999) (rejecting imposition of duty on church to protect one church 
member from sexual abuse by another member: "The creation of an amorphous common 
8 
law duty on the part of a church or other voluntary organization requiring it to protect its 
members from each other would give rise to 'both unlimited liability and liability out of 
all proportion to culpability/") (citation omitted). 
Of course, this case does not present the issue of whether churches have - or 
constitutionally could have - special common law duties to prevent, protect against, or 
report child sexual abuse, and there is certainly no need for this Court to address that 
issue in this case. The point here is simply that regardless of the merits of the Savages' 
position, there are powerful arguments that § 78-12-25.1 is perfectly constitutional in 
other contexts, precluding facial invalidation of the statute. 
III. The Savages5 Uniform Operation of Laws Arguments Should Likewise Be 
Considered an "As-Applied" Challenge That Does Not Decide the 
Constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.1 on Its Face or in Other 
Contexts. 
The Savages also contend that to the extent § 78-12-25.1 bars their claims it 
further violates Article I, § 24 (Uniform Operation of Laws Clause) of the Utah 
Constitution. See Brf. Aplt., pp. 23-25. For many of the same reasons as those stated 
above, this argument should also be subjected to an as-applied analysis. 
As with their Open Courts arguments, the Savages have expressly denominated 
their § 24 challenge to § 78-12-25.1 as an as-applied attack and not as an attempt to 
invalidate the statute under all circumstances. See Brf. Aplt, pp. 23, 25 ("as applied" the 
statute violates § 24). More substantively, the Savages' § 24 challenge should be 
addressed in an as-applied setting because, depending on the facts and claims at issue, the 
9 
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny in this case might well be very different than in other 
potential cases challenging § 78-12-25.1. "[T]he broad outlines of the analytical model 
used in determining compliance with the uniform operation of laws provision remain the 
same in all cases, [but] the level of scrutiny [the Court] give[s] legislative enactments 
varies" depending on whether a fundamental right or suspect classification is at issue. 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989); see Ryan v. 
Gold Cross Se?~vs., Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1995). 
An as-applied analysis under the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause WLII generally 
be required in situations where the Open Courts inquiry under different facts is capable of 
producing different outcomes and thus different standards of judicial scrutiny, because 
the degree of judicial scrutiny is often outcome determinative.4 That is precisely the 
situation when § 78-12-25.1 is at issue. The Savages contend that the Open Courts 
Clause guarantees them a legal remedy against the Utah Youth Village. If that turns out 
to be true, then their § 24 challenge to § 78-12-25.1 might well require heightened 
scrutiny, assuming they have properly defined the relevant class and that the statute 
4
 Such was the case in McCorvey v. Utah State Dept. Of Transportation, 868 P.2d 
41 (Utah 1993). In McCorvey, this Court held "that there is no 'fundamental right' [under 
the Open Courts Clause] to recover damages from government entities performing 
governmental functions." Id. at 48 (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting) (summarizing 
majority holding); see id. (majority opinion) (statute "does not infringe on a fundamental 
right"). Based on that conclusion, the Court ruled that "therefore a heightened standard 
of scrutiny is not applicable for determining the constitutionality" under § 24 of applying 
the challenged statute to the facts of that case. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting; 
emphasis added); see id. (majority opinion). 
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actually discriminates. See McCoiyey, 868 P.2d at 48. However, as outlined above, it is 
most likely that the Open Courts Clause does not ensure a common law remedy against 
churches for failure to prevent, warn against, or report member-on-member child abuse. 
Thus, a § 24 challenge in a case involving a church would be subject to a very deferential 
standard of review that would almost assuredly uphold the statute as applied to churches. 
See Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, If 23, 48 P.3d 941 ("low threshold" applies 
under § 24 in a case not involving fundamental rights or suspect classifications and 
"statute has a strong presumption of constitutionality, with doubts resolved in favor of its 
constitutionality") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). After all, it can hardly 
be a violation of § 24 if a statute specifically precludes a class of persons from obtaining a 
remedy that doesn't even exist - for anyone - in the first place. 
The fact that § 78-12-25.1 could be constitutional under § 24 in the context of 
churches necessarily precludes a successful facial challenge here. The Savages' Uniform 
Operation of Laws arguments should be expressly adjudicated as an as-applied challenge. 
11 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Savages' objections to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
25.1 based on Article I, §§ 11 & 24 should be considered as-applied and not facial 
challenges. The Church takes no position on the constitutionality of § 78-12-25.1 as 
applied to the facts and claims in this case. 
Dated this U- day of September, 2003. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
V O N ^ J . K E E T e T 
ALEXANDER DUSHKU 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
Corporation of the President of The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints 
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